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We used a new methodological approach to investigate whether top-down influences like
expertise determine the extent of unconscious processing. This approach does not rely on
preexisting differences between experts and novices, but instructs essentially the same
task in a way that either addresses a domain of expertise or not. Participants either were
instructed to perform a lexical decision task (expert task) or to respond to a combination
of single features of word and non-word stimuli (novel task). The stimuli and importantly
also the mapping of responses to those stimuli, however, were exactly the same in both
groups. We analyzed congruency effects of masked primes depending on the instructed
task. Participants performing the expert task responded faster and less error prone when
the prime was response congruent rather than incongruent. This effect was significantly
reduced in the novel task, and even reversed when excluding identical prime-target pairs.
This indicates that the primes in the novel task had an effect on a perceptual level, but
were not able to impact on response activation. Overall, these results demonstrate an
expertise-based top-down modulation of unconscious processing that cannot be explained
by confounds that are otherwise inherent in comparisons between novices and experts.
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INTRODUCTION
The possibilities and limits of unconscious information pro-
cessing have been an issue of considerable debate (cf. Van den
Bussche et al., 2009). Only recently, evidence came up that
expertise with a particular stimulus domain is a crucial determi-
nant of the capability to process stimuli that are related to the
expertise without awareness. For example, expert chess players
(Kiesel et al., 2009) and expert typists (Heinemann et al., 2010)
processed unconsciously presented expertise-related information
while novices’ performance remained unaffected by the same
unconscious stimulation. This also underlines a different (e.g.,
more configural) processing of expertise-related stimuli, which is
a key characteristic of expertise (Gobet and Simon, 1996; Gauthier
and Tarr, 1997).
Research on expertise, however, suffers from the notorious
methodical problem of relying on a quasi-experimental variable,
which invites all kinds of alternative interpretations in terms of
subject-related confounds and self-selection problems. In other
words, experts may differ from novices not only in terms of
practice with a certain task or skill but in other personality traits as
well, which eventually determine who becomes an expert and who
does not. Ideally, to rule out such subject-related accounts one
would wish to study essentially the same subjects once as experts
and once as novices.
Here, we suggest such an approach, which we call de-
expertisation. While all participants responded to the same stimuli
in the same way, we allowed only some participants to process
stimuli by their expert processing routines, whereas we intention-
ally de-expertised some other participants by instruction.
Concretely, half of the participants performed a lexical deci-
sion task on the words es (German for “it”) and so (German
for “so”) and the non-words os and se. This task is based on
reading, a skill in which all participants can be considered experts
through their long lasting practice (cf. Ericsson, 2006). The other
participants responded according to location and identity of the
vowel. One response was assigned to an e on the left or an o
on the right side, and the other response to an o on the left or
an e on the right side, resulting in the same stimulus-response
mapping as with the lexical task (see Figure 1). Crucially, the
expert group addressed a domain of expertise (word reading),
whereas the “novice” group performed the task in a way that
requires to explicitly combine letter identity and location, which
is not associated with any expertise.
Before each target stimulus, a masked prime from the same
set of stimuli was presented. This prime either afforded the same
response as the target and was thus response congruent (e.g.,
prime os is response congruent to targets os and se, and prime
so is response congruent to targets so and es), or it afforded a
different response than the target and was thus response incon-
gruent (e.g., prime se is response incongruent to targets es and
so, and prime es is response incongruent to targets os and se).
If expertise truly determines whether unconscious stimuli are
processed, participants with the lexical task should respond faster
and less error prone when the masked prime stimulus is response
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FIGURE 1 | Stimuli and mapping for both tasks. All stimuli and the corresponding mapping of stimuli to responses are identical in both tasks. Only the
instruction differs: participants are either instructed to respond to the target being a word or a non-word, or to respond to the position and identity of the vowel.
congruent compared to response incongruent (Dehaene et al.,
1998). For the “novices,” however, response congruency of the
prime should have no or considerably less impact. In a manner
of speaking, the “novices” perform the task in a way in which an
illiterate person might approach the task, namely by responding
not to the (non-)word status, which would be unknown to them,
but by responding simply to perceptual features. Of course, the
participants in the novice group were still able to read the words,
but when asked after the experiments, none of them indicated to
have responded to the words’ status, but indeed to the position of
the o or the e within the target. As such, one might imagine them
basically as instructed illiterates.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Forty-eight students of the University of Würzburg with an aver-
age age of 22 years participated in this experiment, 24 each in the
expert group and the “novice” group. All reported having normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, were German native speakers and
were not familiar with the purpose of the experiment.
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. An IBM
compatible computer with a 17 inch VGA-Display and the soft-
ware package E-Prime™ were used for stimulus presentation
and response recording. Stimulus presentation was synchronized
with the vertical retraces of a 100-Hz monitor. Responses were
executed with the index fingers of both hands and collected with
external response keys. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation
cross (500 ms) was presented, followed by a forward pattern mask
(70 ms), the prime (20 ms), and a backward pattern mask (70 ms).
The target was presented directly after the backward mask for
200 ms, followed by a blank screen while waiting for the response.
All stimuli were presented in the center of the screen in white
Courier New font on black background. The masks consisted of
four hash tags and were presented with a point size of 40, prime
and target letters were presented with a point size of 36. The target
and prime stimuli set consisted solely of the word-stimuli es and
so, and the non-word stimuli se and os.
The 16 possible prime-target-combinations were used four
times in each block, which thus consisted of 64 trials presented
in pseudo-random order. After a practice block, participants per-
formed eight blocks with self-paced pauses between each block.
At the end of the experiment, we tested prime visibility in a
signal detection task. Participants were fully informed about the
structure of a trial and the sequence of the presented stimuli. They
were instructed to respond to the prime instead of the target.
Within an interval of 1000 ms after prime-target presentation
participants could not respond (see Vorberg et al., 2003, for
implementing such a reversed response window procedure). This
was done to avoid measuring the unconscious effect of the prime
on the free response choice (see Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2004;
Kiesel et al., 2006) instead of the ability to discriminate the prime.
To counteract effects of high task difficulty (Pratte and Rouder,
2009), 50% of trials in the prime visibility test contained a visible
prime for half of the participants. An experimental session lasted
approximately 60 min.
RESULTS
A mixed-design ANOVA on RTs (excluding error trials and trials
with RTs deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from the
participant’s mean RT in the experimental condition of this trial)
with the within-subject factor response congruency (congruent
vs. incongruent) and the between-subject factor task (expert vs.
novice) showed main effects of congruency, F(1, 46) = 44.37,
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FIGURE 2 | Results. RTs (A) and error rates (B) as a function of task
(expert vs. novice) and response congruency. Error bars depict 95%
within-subject confidence intervals (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
p < 0.001, and task, F(1, 46) = 7.91, p = 0.007. Participants
responded 11 ms faster for congruent rather than incongruent
prime-target pairs, and experts responded 63 ms faster than
novices (see Figure 2). Crucially, the interaction of congruency
and task was highly significant, F(1, 46) = 10.80, p = 0.002.
This interaction is driven by an 11 ms larger congruency effect
in the expert group than in the novice group, t(46) = 3.29,
p = 0.002. Experts responded 17 ms faster after congruent than
after incongruent primes, t(23) = 6.97, p < 0.001, while the
congruency effect only amounted to 6 ms in the novice group,
t(23)= 2.41, p= 0.024.
The same ANOVA on error rates revealed a main effect of
congruency, F(1, 46) = 16.97, p < 0.001, with 1.2% less errors
with congruent primes, and again an interaction of congruency
and task, F(1, 46) = 4.46, p = 0.040. Experts made 2.5% less
errors in congruent trials than in incongruent trials, t(23)= 2.64,
p = 0.023, while errors did not differ significantly between
congruent and incongruent trials for novices, t(23) = 1.62,
p= 0.12.
To further elucidate the underlying processes of these results,
we excluded trials that featured identical prime-target-pairs. In
these trials, response facilitation cannot only be due to response
priming, but also due to perceptual priming. By excluding these
trials, the remaining congruent trials notably feature no per-
ceptual overlap (neither the location nor the identity of the
vowel are the same in prime and target, e.g., os and se), whereas
prime and target in incongruent trials are partially perceptually
overlapping (e.g., os and es). Thus, any response facilitation in
congruent compared to incongruent trials indicates processes of
response activation that even overcame the perceptual advan-
tage of incongruent over congruent trials. Conversely, faster
responses in incongruent trials reflect the impact of a low-
level perceptual effect over effects of response activation. The
same ANOVA as before on RTs revealed a main effect of task,
F(1, 46) = 9.267, p = 0.004, as well a reverse main effect of
congruency, F(1, 46) = 4.848, p = 0.033, with faster responses
after incongruent primes than after congruent primes. Further-
more, we found a highly significant interaction of congruency
and task, F(1, 46) = 28.630, p < 0.001. This interaction is
characterized by a regular congruency effect of 6 ms in the
expert task, t(23) = 2.988, p = 0.007, in conjunction with a
14 ms reverse congruency effect in the novice task, t(23)= 4.443,
p< 0.001.
With error rates, again excluding identical prime-target-pairs,
this ANOVA reveals a main effect of congruency, F(1, 46)= 6.795,
p = 0.012, which is modulated by an interaction with task,
F(1, 46) = 5.209, p = 0.027. The main effect of task was not
significant, F < 1. The interaction is characterized by a signifi-
cant congruency effect (2.0%) in the expert task, t(23) = 3.064,
p = 0.005, with no significant congruency effect (0.1%) in the
novice task, t(23)= 0.269, p= 0.790.
Post-experimental signal detection tests confirmed that there
was no difference in prime visibility between the expert and the
novice group (F< 1), suggesting that any difference in the primes’
effectiveness are not due to differences in prime visibility. In the
expert group, d’ was 0.16, t(23) = 2.249, p = 0.034, and in the
novice group, d’ was 0.21, t(23) = 4.531, p < 0.001. To test
whether the congruency effect is related to individual prime visi-
bility, a regression analysis as proposed by Draine and Greenwald
(1998, see also Greenwald et al., 1995, 1996) was computed. For
each participant, a priming index was calculated [100 × (RT
incongruent–RT congruent)/RT congruent] as a measure of the
primes’ impact on responses. Individual priming indices were
then regressed onto individual d’-values, task (coded as 0.5 for
expert and −0.5 for novice), and the interaction (i.e., product)
of both predictor variables. The regression analysis confirmed
that task was a significant predictor of priming, t(46) = 3.115,
p = 0.003. In contrast, prime visibility, t(46) = 0.164, p = 0.870,
and the interaction of prime visibility and task, t(46) = 0.270,
p = 0.789, were not significant predictors of priming. A separate
analysis for the expert group revealed an intercept that was signifi-
cantly larger than zero t(23)= 6.01, p< 0.001. This result implies
that a priming effect would still occur with zero prime visibility.
Additionally, prime visibility and the priming index were not
significantly correlated with each other, t(23)= 0.090, p= 0.929.
Overall, this result pattern (significant intercept, non-significant
slope) “is consistent with unconscious cognition dissociated from
conscious cognition” (Greenwald et al., 1995, p. 32). In the
novice group, there was no significant correlation between prime
visibility and the priming index, t(23) = 0.292, p = 0.773, and
the intercept was not significantly larger than zero, t(23)= 1.548,
p= 0.136.
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To rule out that the primes remained ineffective for the novices
simply because responses were slower overall and the primes’
impact decayed over time, we looked at RT distributions of
experts and novices and analyzed whether congruency effects
depended on RT level. To this end, RTs of each participant were
rank ordered and divided into ten equal-sized speed bins for
congruent and incongruent trials. Congruency effects were then
calculated for each bin. An ANOVA on congruency effects with
the within-subject factor RT bin revealed that there was no main
effect of RT bin in the novice group (F < 1), suggesting that
the level of response speed had no significant influence on the
emergence (or non-emergence) of a congruency effect. Further-
more, we analyzed whether the congruency effect in the expert
group still differs from the congruency effect in the novice group
when overall RT levels are comparable. To this end, we excluded
the slowest 20% of congruent and incongruent responses in the
novice group, which results in comparable RT levels between the
two groups (F < 1), before analyzing differences in congruency
effects. This comparison still revealed a larger congruency effect
in the expert group than in the novice group, t(46) = 2.387,
p = 0.021. This indicates that the observed difference in congru-
ency effects is not caused by overall different RT levels, as a virtual
elimination of RT level differences does not lead to an elimination
of the differences in the congruency effect.
DISCUSSION
We investigated whether the effectiveness of masked stimuli can
be modulated by instructing participants in a way that either
addresses expert processing routines or not. While in terms of
stimulus-response-mappings all participants had to perform the
same task, the task was described as a lexical decision task for one
group of participants, and as a task that requires the combination
of several different stimulus features for the other participants.
Overall, the results show that masked stimuli impacted on behav-
ior considerably more when participants’ task performance relied
on reading expertise, enabling the prime to influence responding
by means of word identity. Conceivably, reading enabled holistic
processing at the word level (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981).
In contrast, the novice task forced an analytical processing at the
letter level, and participants would have to integrate the features
identity of the vowel and location of the vowel, which likely
requires attention and conscious stimulus representation (Treis-
man, 1996), thus diminishing the primes’ impact. Furthermore,
the congruency effect in the novice task seems to be based solely
on low-level perceptual facilitation, but not on response activa-
tion, a pattern that can be observed when excluding identical
prime-target pairs from the analysis. Here, RTs after response
congruent, but perceptually non-identical prime-target pairs were
slower than after response incongruent, but partly perceptually
overlapping prime-target pairs. This reversed congruency effect
thus indicates that the primes were not able to exert an effect based
on their response activation (which seems to be absent), but only
based on perceptual facilitation.
A similar instance of de-expertisation can be observed when
the task-relevance of expertise-related stimuli is manipulated
(Harel et al., 2010). When car experts have to recognize car
models, the presentation of cars leads to specific brain activity
compared to the presentation of planes, a difference that is
not found with novices. However, when the task was not to
recognize car models, this neural expression of expertise was
drastically reduced (i.e., there was no difference between novices
and experts). Thus, expertise can indeed be top-down modulated
in a way that suppresses even expertise-related activation on a
neuronal level (cf. Harel et al., 2013).
The crucial aspect of the design at hand is that the two tasks
differ only in their instruction, with everything else in terms of
stimuli, responses, and stimulus-response assignments remaining
identical. An observer watching a participant would not be able
to tell which of the two tasks is performed, as on a basic S-R-level,
all participants were doing the same. It is through instructions
which either addressed a domain of expertise or not that stimuli
are processed differently, but not for example because of changes
in S-R-mappings that come along with changing tasks (Norris and
Kinoshita, 2008). These results mirror studies that investigated
how identical stimuli can be processed differently through top-
down or contextual influences (Schyns and Oliva, 1999; Harel
and Bentin, 2009; Lupyan et al., 2010; Van Opstal et al., 2011).
Of course, it is possible that not only the instructions per se, but
also the execution of the differently instructed tasks lead to the
differential effects of unconscious stimulation. While instruction
itself has been found capable of creating S-R-bindings (e.g.,
Wenke et al., 2007), it cannot be excluded that task execution
played a role in the experiment at hand, too.
One might argue that the two instructions differ not only in
addressing expertise or not, but also for example in requiring
semantic processing vs. perceptual processing, and thus simply
contrast semantic priming with perceptual priming. However,
there is no reason to expect an effect of perceptual priming to be
absent or smaller than semantic priming. If anything, an effect of
semantic priming would be expected to be harder to demonstrate
(e.g., Damian, 2001), and both semantic and perceptual priming
have been shown to be observable when participants have accord-
ing action goals (Martens et al., 2011). Thus, the observed result
pattern is unlikely caused simply by semantic and perceptual
priming leading to different (or absent) priming effects. Likewise,
the results could be seen as a consequence of holistic vs. analytical
processing. This does not constitute an alternative explanation
compared to an effect of expertise, but holistic processing is in fact
a central aspect of expertise, which has for example been demon-
strated numerous times with expert chess players (de Groot and
Gobet, 1996; Gobet and Charness, 2006). Holistic processing of
the prime stimulus, triggered by addressing expert processing
routines, was conceivably a central mechanism that enabled an
impact of the unconsciously presented prime.
Regarding general mechanisms of unconscious processing, our
findings confirm the assumption that the processing of uncon-
sciously presented stimuli hinges on suitable top-down settings
(e.g., Kunde et al., 2003, 2005; Kiefer and Brendel, 2006; Kiefer
and Martens, 2010; Martens et al., 2011). Martens and colleagues
showed that when a preceding task induces a particular task set
(e.g., a semantic vs. a perceptual task set), the effect of masked
primes is modulated by this task set. For example, after a semantic
task, the primes’ impact was based on their semantic value, while
after a perceptual task, semantic value of the prime had no impact.
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Likewise, in the study at hand, different top-down settings were
induced by different instructions for technically the same task,
which strongly modulated the way primes were processed.
To conclude, we showed that expertise crucially influences
the possibilities of unconscious processing. In contrast to earlier
studies on this subject, we did not compare experts and novices,
but varied task instructions so that expertise in reading was
either addressed or not. The observed effects therefore cannot
be attributed to ulterior differences between groups, but are
unambiguously linked to expert processing routines.
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